

Beyond Recommendations: Data-Driven Regional Legislative Oversight against Corruption in Indonesia

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Abstract

Decentralization has made Indonesian regional governments a major arena of corruption, yet the oversight function of regional legislatures (DPRD) remains weak and largely untested in a digitalised budget cycle. This article asks how DPRD oversight is regulated under Law Number 23 of 2014, where its preventive force against corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) is lost, how digital government data affect it, and how it can be strengthened. Drawing on a critical case study of West Bandung Regency, where two successive regents were convicted of corruption and the 2024 integrity score remained “vulnerable,” the study combines doctrinal analysis with purposive semi-structured interviews with members of two DPRD commissions, triangulated with court reports, statutory follow-up norms, and public integrity data. The findings show a clear legal mandate and a largely preventive practice—budget scrutiny, field verification, and monitoring of Audit Board follow-up—but reveal a post-recommendation gap: DPRD recommendations carry no response duty, and inconsistent records in electronic planning systems prevent legislators from verifying where funds go. The article proposes a data-driven follow-up accountability model that requires a time-bound executive response to recommendations, modelled on existing audit and Ombudsman follow-up duties, and gives legislative commissions structured access to government data. The model strengthens regional legislative oversight in the digital era without granting executory powers and is transferable to other Indonesian regions governed by the same law.



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INTRODUCTION

Corruption, collusion, and nepotism (*korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme*, hereafter KKN) remain among the most persistent problems of Indonesian public administration, and decentralization has moved a considerable part of that problem to the regions. Between 2004 and 2024 the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) handled 618 corruption cases in regency and city governments, and 167 regents, mayors, and their deputies were caught in

corruption cases.¹ Critical scholarship has long warned that decentralization in Indonesia opened space for local predatory coalitions to capture newly devolved budgets and authority.² Empirical studies of regional corruption show that its prevention depends on the substance of the law, the capacity of enforcement institutions, and community culture, while research on local governance finds that well-designed regional regulations are often undermined by weak coordination, limited resources, and low public awareness.³ Law Number 28 of 1999 responds by placing legal certainty, openness, proportionality, professionalism, and accountability at the heart of state administration.⁴

Within regional government, the most direct institutional counterweight to the executive is the Regional House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, DPRD). Following Indonesian statutory usage (*daerah*), “regional” in this article covers provinces, regencies, and cities. Law Number 23 of 2014 makes the DPRD and the regional head the two elements of regional government and grants the regency DPRD three functions: regional law-making, budgeting, and oversight.⁵ The oversight function covers the implementation of regional regulations, other laws relating to regional government, and the follow-up of findings of the Audit Board of Indonesia (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan*, BPK).⁶ Comparative research shows that the tools legislatures possess matter less than whether those tools are actually used and produce consequences.⁷

Oversight is also changing in character. Regional planning, budgeting, and procurement are increasingly managed through electronic systems, and an established literature treats e-government and open data as anti-corruption instruments because they reduce discretion and increase the visibility of public transactions.⁸ Recent scholarship in this journal argues that Indonesia’s digital administration still lacks an enforceable framework of accountability,

¹ “KPK RI: 167 Kepala Daerah Terjerat Korupsi Sepanjang 2004–2024,” *Antara News Bangka Belitung*, August 14, 2024, <https://babel.antaranews.com/berita/425503/kpk-ri-167-kepala-daerah-terjerat-korupsi-sepanjang-2004-2024>.

² Vedi R. Hadiz, “Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives,” *Development and Change* 35, no. 4 (2004): 697–718, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00376.x>.

³ Ridwan Arifin and Noviana Dwi Utami, “Implementasi Penegakan Hukum Anti Korupsi pada Kasus Korupsi Daerah,” *Litigasi* 20, no. 1 (2019): 57–81, <https://doi.org/10.23969/litigasi.v20i1.1353>; Hariyanto Hariyanto, Ahmad Rezy Meidina, and Mabarroh Azizah, “Decentralization and the Fulfilments of Children’s Rights: Challenges and Opportunities for Local Government in Indonesia,” *Lex Scientia Law Review* 8, no. 2 (2024): 677–706, <https://doi.org/10.15294/lslr.v8i2.14373>.

⁴ Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 28 of 1999 concerning State Administration that is Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism, art. 3.

⁵ Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, as last amended by Law Number 9 of 2015, arts. 57 and 149(1).

⁶ Law Number 23 of 2014, art. 153.

⁷ Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst, *Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation*, Policy Research Working Paper 3388 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/d491f73e-6d3c-50c7-8205-fb1bc280d9da>.

⁸ John C. Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. Grimes, “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of Transparency: E-Government and Social Media as Openness and Anti-Corruption Tools for Societies,” *Government Information Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2010): 264–71, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2010.03.001>; Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, “E-Government as an Anti-Corruption Strategy,” *Information Economics and Policy* 21, no. 3 (2009): 201–10, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2008.11.003>.

transparency, and data protection.⁹ In Indonesia, a recent study finds that e-budgeting and e-procurement work only partially because of weak coordination, political interference, and technical constraints.¹⁰ Whether, and how, a regional legislature uses digital government data to prevent KKN is therefore a legal question of the digital era.

This article examines these questions through a case study of West Bandung Regency (*Kabupaten Bandung Barat*), West Java, selected as a critical case in which the weaknesses of regional legislative oversight should be most visible.¹¹ In April 2018 the then Regent, Abubakar, was arrested in a KPK sting operation for allegedly collecting money from heads of regional agencies to finance his wife's campaign in the 2018 regency election.¹² His successor, Aa Umbara Sutisna, was sentenced by the Bandung Corruption Court to five years in prison for arranging the 2020 procurement of emergency COVID-19 social assistance at the regency's Social Affairs Office.¹³ In the 2024 Integrity Assessment Survey (*Survei Penilaian Integritas*, SPI), the regency scored 69.85, which falls in the "vulnerable" band (below 73) and below the national index of 71.53.¹⁴ Two consecutive regents prosecuted for corruption and a vulnerable integrity score point to a structural gap between the legal design of DPRD oversight (*das sollen*) and governance reality (*das sein*). Because every regency and city DPRD operates under the same Law Number 23 of 2014 and the same national planning and budgeting systems, what fails in this case is likely to be relevant to regional legislatures throughout Indonesia.

Indonesian scholarship on DPRD oversight has mostly been normative or descriptive. Earlier studies frame oversight as an element of good governance and regional autonomy.¹⁵ Others link legislative oversight to a bureaucracy free from KKN.¹⁶ More recent work argues that oversight must become more technical, that it is limited by capacity, and that in West Java

⁹ Hananta Aldhanny Wibisono, Reza Octavia Kusumaningtyas, and Helmi Ayuradi Miharja, "E-Government and Artificial Intelligence in Electronic Administration: A Normative Legal Analysis of Modern Government Digitalization," *Journal of Law and Digital Civilization* 1, no. 1 (2026): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.66277/jldc.v1i1.20>.

¹⁰ Edi Candra and M. B. Zubakhrum Tjenreng, "Decentralization and Corruption: Policy and Legal Study on the Effectiveness of Local Financial Oversight," *Jurnal Hukum Replik* 13, no. 1 (2025): 17–34, <https://doi.org/10.31000/jhr.v13i1.13686>.

¹¹ Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research," *Qualitative Inquiry* 12, no. 2 (2006): 219–45, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363>.

¹² "Eks Bupati Bandung Barat Abubakar Jalani Sidang Vonis Hari Ini," *Suara.com*, December 17, 2018, <https://www.suara.com/news/2018/12/17/123401/eks-bupati-bandung-barat-abubakar-jalani-sidang-vonis-hari-ini>.

¹³ "Korupsi Bansos COVID-19 Rp 2,7 M, Bupati Bandung Barat Divonis 5 Tahun Bui," *MerahPutih.com*, November 5, 2021, <https://www.merahputih.com/post/read/korupsi-bansos-covid-19-rp-2-7-m-bupati-bandung-barat-divonis-5-tahun-bui>.

¹⁴ Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, "SPI 2024: Skor Merah Jadi Pekerjaan Rumah yang Harus Diselesaikan Pemda," accessed July 8, 2026, <https://www.kpk.go.id>; "Pemkab Bandung Barat Tempati Posisi 14 Hasil SPI 2024 KPK," *Radar Bandung*, accessed July 8, 2026; "KPK Ungkap Indeks Integritas Nasional 2024 Naik Jadi 71,53," *Antara News Jawa Timur*, January 22, 2025, <https://jatim.antaranews.com/berita/873190/kpk-ungkap-indeks-integritas-nasional-2024-naik-jadi-7153>.

¹⁵ Budiyono, "Pelaksanaan Fungsi Pengawasan DPRD terhadap Pemerintah Daerah dalam Rangka Mewujudkan Good Governance," *Fiat Justitia Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 7, no. 1 (2013): 1–12; M. Agus Santoso, "Peran Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah dalam Menjalankan Fungsi Pengawasan," *Jurnal Hukum Lus Quia Iustum* 18, no. 4 (October 2011): 604–20.

¹⁶ Djauhari and Achmad Ridwan, "Fungsi Pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) terhadap Kinerja Pemerintahan Daerah dalam Mewujudkan Aparatur Pemerintahan yang Bersih Bebas dari Korupsi Kolusi Nepotisme (KKN)," *Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum* 2, no. 2 (2015): 173–84; Hamdani et al., "Fungsi Pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah dalam Tata Kelola Pemerintahan Daerah yang Bersih dan Bebas Korupsi: Studi Kasus di DPRK Aceh Timur," *Iuris Studia: Jurnal Kajian Hukum* 2, no. 2 (2021): 285–93.

a gap persists between complete regulation and field implementation.¹⁷

The state of the art can thus be summarised as follows: the literature agrees that DPRD oversight is normatively complete but practically weak, yet it has not examined, on the basis of field evidence from a regency with a documented record of executive corruption, at which point in the oversight cycle effectiveness is lost, nor how digital government data affect that cycle. We call this missing link the *post-recommendation gap*: the stage at which oversight findings exist but no legal procedure obliges the executive to answer them. This article addresses that gap by asking three questions: (1) how the oversight authority of the DPRD is regulated under Law Number 23 of 2014 and implemented in the case regency to prevent KKN; (2) which factors, including the quality of digital government data, shape its effectiveness and its conformity with the Law; and (3) what model can strengthen it. Its novelty lies in locating the weakness of oversight in the post-recommendation gap and in proposing a data-driven follow-up accountability model that builds on existing statutory follow-up duties without converting the DPRD into an executory body.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses an empirical juridical (socio-legal) approach, which examines law both as written norms and as it operates in governmental practice, with a descriptive-analytical design.¹⁸ Primary data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with informants selected purposively on two criteria: holding a position in a DPRD commission (*komisi*) with oversight duties over governance or development programmes, and direct involvement in budget deliberation and field oversight. Two informants were interviewed: Sandi Supyandi, Chair of Commission I (interviewed on August 5, 2026, 09.00–11.30 WIB), and H. Agus Mahdar Hilmi, a member of Commission III (interviewed on August 7, 2026, 18.45–21.30 WIB). The interview guide covered the members' understanding of their mandate, oversight practice at each stage of the budget cycle, the follow-up of BPK findings, supporting and inhibiting factors, and proposals for improvement. Both informants were interviewed in their official capacity as public office holders, and their statements are attributed by name and position; quotations are translated by the authors, with the Indonesian original given in the notes.

To reduce reliance on self-reported data, interview statements were triangulated with three types of secondary sources: primary legal materials (the 1945 Constitution, Laws Number 23 and 17 of 2014, Law Number 28 of 1999, Law Number 15 of 2004, Government Regulations Number 12 of 2018 and Number 13 of 2019, and regulations on electronic government); court and KPK reports on the two corruption cases; and public integrity data from the SPI.¹⁹ The data were reduced, classified according to the research questions, and interpreted through three theoretical layers: the rule of law and good governance, Soerjono Soekanto's theory of legal

¹⁷ Greg Suripatty, Hendrik Salmon, and Julista Mustamu, "Pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah dalam Mencegah Korupsi di Daerah," *PAMALI: Pattimura Magister Law Review* 3, no. 2 (2023): 181–205, <https://doi.org/10.47268/pamali.v3i2.1867>; Desi Ratnasari, Muh. Risnain, and Muh. Alfian Fallahiyan, "Implementasi Peran Fungsi Pengawasan DPRD NTB dalam Mewujudkan Good Governance," *Jurnal Diskresi* 3, no. 2 (2024): 105–12, <https://doi.org/10.29303/diskresi.v3i2.6018>; D. E. Rizaldi et al., "The Role of the West Java Province DPRD in Supervision," *Justisi: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 11, no. 1 (2026), <https://doi.org/10.36805/hjrre111>.

¹⁸ Mukti Fajar ND and Yulianto Achmad, *Dualisme Penelitian Hukum Normatif dan Empiris* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2010), 47.

¹⁹ Soerjono Soekanto, *Pengantar Penelitian Hukum* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1986), 51.

effectiveness, and oversight theory.²⁰ Two limitations should be stated. The empirical material reflects the legislature's perspective, as executive officials and civil society were not interviewed; and internal DPRD documents, such as recommendations on the regent's accountability report and minutes of working meetings, were not analysed systematically. Findings that depend on these sources are therefore presented as indicative rather than conclusive. The study does not claim statistical generalisation; rather, it offers analytical generalisation, in that the post-recommendation gap and the proposed model derive from national legal provisions and can be tested in other regencies and cities.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The Normative Architecture of DPRD Oversight

Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution establishes regional governments with elected DPRD, and Article 1(3) declares Indonesia a state based on law.²¹ Together these provisions imply that regional autonomy must be exercised accountably and under democratic control. Asshiddiqie stresses that in a constitutional democracy representative institutions exist not only to make policy but to keep governmental power within the law.²² Law Number 23 of 2014 operationalises this design through Articles 57, 149(1), and 153, and Article 159(1) equips the regency DPRD with the rights of interpellation, inquiry (*angket*), and expressing an opinion.²³ Government Regulation Number 12 of 2018 translates oversight into working meetings, hearings, working visits, and recommendations, while Government Regulation Number 13 of 2019 governs the regional head's accountability report (LKPI), which the DPRD deliberates and on which it issues recommendations.²⁴ Table 1 summarises the framework.

Table 1: Normative basis of DPRD oversight relevant to KKN prevention

No	Legal instrument	Provision	Substance for oversight
1	1945 Constitution	Art. 1(3); Art. 18(1)–(3)	Rule of law; regional governments with elected DPRD
2	Law No. 28 of 1999	Art. 3	Principles of clean state administration free from KKN
3	Law No. 23 of 2014	Arts. 57, 149(1), 153	DPRD as element of regional government; oversight functions incl. follow-up of BPK findings
4	Law No. 23 of 2014	Art. 159(1)	Rights of interpellation, inquiry, and expressing an opinion
5	Government Regulation No. 12 of 2018	Rules of procedure	Working meetings, hearings, working visits, recommendations
6	Government Regulation No. 13 of 2019	LKPI	Deliberation of the regional head's accountability report and DPRD recommendations

²⁰ Soerjono Soekanto, *Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Penegakan Hukum* (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2008), 8.

²¹ Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945, arts. 1(3) and 18(1)–(3).

²² Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2015), 291.

²³ Law Number 23 of 2014, arts. 57, 149(1), 153, and 159(1).

²⁴ Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 12 of 2018 concerning Guidelines for Drafting the Rules of Procedure of Provincial, Regency, and City DPRD; Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 13 of 2019 concerning Reports and Evaluation of Regional Government Administration.

No	Legal instrument	Provision	Substance for oversight
7	Law No. 15 of 2004; Government Regulation No. 60 of 2008	Art. 20; internal control system	External audit follow-up duty; internal supervision by APIP

Source: *Analysed from primary legal materials.*

Theoretically, the oversight function is a direct expression of the rule of law. Stahl's *rechtsstaat* requires the division of power and government according to law, while Dicey's rule of law insists that officials stand equal before the law and remain subject to it.²⁵ Good governance adds transparency, accountability, participation, and effectiveness, which the UNDP regards as core attributes of public governance.²⁶ From the perspective of administrative law, oversight does not aim to obstruct government but to keep administrative action within its legal authority and to correct deviations early.²⁷ In the digital era these principles acquire a new object: if governmental decisions are increasingly embodied in data and systems, accountability requires that those data and systems be open to legitimate scrutiny.

DPRD oversight must be distinguished from other forms of control. The regional inspectorate, as part of the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP), performs internal supervision within the executive under the government internal control system, while the BPK performs external financial audit.²⁸ The authority of internal auditors to prevent abuses of power that cause state losses is itself spread across several legal instruments.²⁹ DPRD oversight is democratic and political: it derives legitimacy from representation and asks whether public power is used in line with the law and the public interest. The three forms are complementary. The DPRD lacks auditors' investigative tools but has a public mandate and a forum in which the regional head must explain and justify policy choices.

A decisive feature of the architecture is that DPRD outputs are recommendatory. The DPRD may request information, evaluate, and recommend, but it cannot annul executive decisions, sanction officials, or carry out corrections itself. This follows from the division of functions under Article 57 and from the principle that the DPRD is a partner and controller rather than a superior of the executive.³⁰ Notably, the law attaches an explicit follow-up duty to BPK recommendations: officials must follow them up and respond to the BPK within sixty days.³¹ No equivalent duty exists for DPRD recommendations. This asymmetry, as the following sections show, is central to understanding the limited preventive force of regional legislative oversight.

²⁵ Miriam Budiardjo, *Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008), 113; A. V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (London: Macmillan, 1959).

²⁶ United Nations Development Programme, *Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document* (New York: UNDP, 1997), 19–20.

²⁷ Ridwan HR, *Hukum Administrasi Negara* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2016), 296.

²⁸ Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 60 of 2008 concerning the Government Internal Control System; Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 15 of 2004 concerning Audit of State Financial Management and Accountability.

²⁹ Helmi Helmi and Iskandar Iskandar, "The Authority of Internal Auditor to Prevent Corruption Committed by Civil Servants and Government Official," *Jambe Law Journal* 2, no. 2 (2019): 139–62, <https://doi.org/10.22437/jlj.2.2.139-162>.

³⁰ Ni'matul Huda, *Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2018), 245.

³¹ Law Number 15 of 2004, art. 20.

Implementation of Oversight: Evidence from the Case Regency

Oversight theory distinguishes preventive oversight, carried out before or during implementation, from corrective oversight after deviations occur, and direct oversight through inspection from indirect oversight through reports and complaints.³² Siboy and Al-Fatih similarly argue that repressive review of regional executive acts should be complemented by preventive control, which legislative bodies are able to exercise.³³ For KKN prevention, the decisive questions are whether the DPRD intervenes early enough in the budget cycle and whether its findings lead to correction. The field data are read along these two lines.

1. Institutional understanding of the oversight role

The Chair of Commission I described the DPRD's role in terms consistent with the statutory design:

"The DPRD is one of the elements of regional government together with the regional head. It has three main functions: regional law-making, budgeting, and oversight. In carrying out oversight, the DPRD does not take over the authority of the regional government; it ensures that government runs in accordance with the rules and the interests of the community."³⁴

A member of Commission III added that oversight runs "from the planning stage, budget deliberation, implementation of activities, through to evaluation."³⁵ This cycle-wide view matters because many irregularities originate at planning and allocation rather than during execution.

2. Budget scrutiny and field verification

The clearest evidence of preventive oversight concerns budget scrutiny with regional agencies:

"In budget discussions the DPRD can find errors, for example one development activity recorded more than once or differences in the budget value. For instance, at one road-construction point there were two budget proposals with different values. When we find something like that, the DPRD asks the agency for clarification to determine the cause, so that there are no errors in budget management and the APBD is used for its intended purpose."³⁶

³² H. Achmad Fauzi, "Fungsi Pengawasan DPRD dalam Mewujudkan Pelaksanaan Pemerintahan Daerah yang Baik," *Jurnal Hukum dan Dinamika Masyarakat* 11, no. 2 (2014): 198–201.

³³ Ahmad Siboy and Sholahuddin Al-Fatih, "The Design of Preventive Control on Local Delegated Legislation: A Case Study of Regional Head Regulations," *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Konstitusi* 8, no. 1 (2025): 111–26, <https://doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v8i1.12862>.

³⁴ Sandi Supyandi, Chair of Commission I of the West Bandung Regency DPRD, interview by Hadian Munandar, West Bandung, August 5, 2026. Translated by the authors. Original: "DPRD merupakan salah satu unsur penyelenggara pemerintahan daerah bersama kepala daerah. DPRD memiliki tiga fungsi utama yaitu fungsi pembentukan peraturan daerah, fungsi anggaran, dan fungsi pengawasan. Dalam menjalankan fungsi pengawasan, DPRD tidak mengambil alih kewenangan pemerintah daerah, tetapi memastikan agar penyelenggaraan pemerintahan berjalan sesuai aturan dan kepentingan masyarakat."

³⁵ H. Agus Mahdar Hilmi, Member of Commission III of the West Bandung Regency DPRD, interview by Hadian Munandar, West Bandung, August 7, 2026. Translated by the authors. Original: "Pengawasan dilakukan mulai dari tahap perencanaan, pembahasan anggaran, pelaksanaan kegiatan, sampai evaluasi."

³⁶ Hilmi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: "Dalam pembahasan anggaran, DPRD dapat menemukan adanya kekeliruan, misalnya terdapat satu kegiatan pembangunan yang tercatat lebih dari satu kali atau terdapat perbedaan nilai anggaran. Contohnya, dalam satu titik pembangunan jalan terdapat dua usulan anggaran dengan nilai yang berbeda."

Detecting duplicated entries before execution is a form of *preventive control*: it closes a classic channel for mark-ups and fictitious spending before any loss occurs. Oversight then continues through field inspections that compare planning documents, the cost budget plan (*Rencana Anggaran Biaya*), and the work order (*Surat Perintah Kerja*) with the physical work; where work does not meet specifications, “notes and recommendations are given for improvement,” and contractors with poor performance are flagged for future procurement.³⁷ Because the 2020 conviction arose from emergency procurement, a sector in which discrepancies between paper and practice are easily concealed, this form of verification is directly relevant to the regency’s risk profile. The evidence is admittedly illustrative: the study did not obtain aggregate figures on the number of duplications detected or recommendations issued, which future research should compile from DPRD records.

3. Follow-up of BPK findings and conflict-of-interest safeguards

Article 153 makes the follow-up of BPK findings an object of DPRD oversight. The Commission III informant explained that where the BPK values completed work below its contract price—for example, nine hundred million rupiah against a one-billion-rupiah budget—the difference must be returned, with the DPRD overseeing the follow-up while the calculation and refund remain within the authority of the BPK and the regional government.³⁸ The DPRD thus acts as a political guarantor of the statutory follow-up duty under Article 20 of Law Number 15 of 2004. The amount to be recovered is not merely a technical matter: the concept of state financial loss, and the line between official and personal responsibility for it, remain contested in Indonesian law.³⁹ The informant also stressed that members may not own companies (such as a CV or PT) working on regional projects, since this would compromise the objectivity of oversight—an important safeguard against the collusion between legislators, contractors, and officials that typically neutralises regional legislative oversight. Enforcing such rules depends on the DPRD’s ethics council, which research elsewhere shows can be weakened by factional influence and restrictive procedures.⁴⁰

Oversight is organised through commissions, each paired with a group of partner agencies, as provided for in the structure of DPRD bodies under Law Number 23 of 2014.⁴¹ The informants regarded this as a supporting factor because each commission “has its own field of

³⁷ Hilmi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: “Apabila ditemukan pekerjaan yang tidak sesuai dengan spesifikasi atau terdapat permasalahan dalam pelaksanaannya, maka dapat diberikan catatan dan rekomendasi untuk dilakukan perbaikan.”

³⁸ Hilmi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: “Dalam hal ini DPRD melakukan fungsi pengawasan terhadap tindak lanjutnya, sedangkan proses perhitungan dan mekanisme pengembalian dilakukan sesuai kewenangan BPK dan pemerintah daerah.”

³⁹ H. Hariyanto, “Official Responsibility and Personal Responsibility in the Context of State Financial Loss,” *Jurnal Dinamika Hukum* 18, no. 1 (2018): 103–8, <https://doi.org/10.20884/1.JDH.2018.18.1.1861>; Aji Rahmadi, Lego Karjoko, and Hartiwiningsih, “The Price of Corruption on State Losses Policy,” *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Konstitusi* 8, no. 2 (2025): 479–502, <https://doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v8i2.14813>; Dewi Muti’ah et al., “Reconceptualisation of State Financial Losses to Prevent Misuse of Village Funds,” *Trunojoyo Law Review* 7, no. 2 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.21107/tlr.v7i2.29856>.

⁴⁰ Nurmadiyah Nurmadiyah, “Implementasi Kewenangan Badan Kehormatan DPRD dalam Penegakan Kode Etik Anggota DPRD di Provinsi NTB,” *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan* 4, no. 3 (2016): 512–25, <https://doi.org/10.29303/ius.v4i3.374>.

⁴¹ Law Number 23 of 2014, art. 163.

duties” and can therefore follow its partner agencies closely.⁴² The Chair of Commission I added that recommendations may extend to personnel: where officials are judged unable to perform on the basis of oversight findings, the DPRD may recommend that the competent authority evaluate, replace, or dismiss them.⁴³ This shows that DPRD oversight has a corrective dimension that reaches beyond programmes to the people who run them. Yet the decision remains with the regent as the holder of personnel authority, which leads directly to the limit discussed next.

4. *The recommendatory ceiling*

Both informants acknowledged that the force of oversight ends at the recommendation. The Chair of Commission I stated that “the implementation of follow-up remains the authority of the regional government; the DPRD can push and remind, but cannot take over executive authority.”⁴⁴ Oversight in the case regency can therefore be characterised as institutionalised preventive and evaluative oversight whose outcomes depend on the executive’s willingness to respond. Two explanations for weak follow-up are plausible. The first is institutional: unlike BPK recommendations, DPRD recommendations carry no response deadline or reporting duty. The second is political: where the regent’s supporting coalition dominates the DPRD, members may be reluctant to escalate to interpellation or inquiry. The present data, drawn from the legislature, support the first explanation directly and cannot exclude the second; both point to the need for a procedure that makes follow-up visible regardless of coalition dynamics.

Digital Data Governance as an Object and Instrument of Oversight

Regional planning, budgeting, and procurement in Indonesia now run largely on electronic platforms. The Regional Government Information System (*Sistem Informasi Pemerintahan Daerah*, SIPD) is mandated for regional planning, finance, and other governance data; procurement is conducted electronically under the presidential regulation on government procurement; and the electronic-based government system (*Sistem Pemerintahan Berbasis Elektronik*, SPBE) sets integration and interoperability as national objectives.⁴⁵ Law Number 14 of 2008 adds that public bodies must provide public information, including budget information, proactively.⁴⁶ Digitalisation therefore changes what the DPRD oversees: not only paper documents, but data held in systems that the legislature does not control.

The field data show why this matters. The Commission III informant described a failure inside the electronic planning system used by the regional government:

⁴² Hilmi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: “Dengan adanya komisi, pengawasan menjadi lebih terarah karena setiap komisi memiliki bidang tugas masing-masing.”

⁴³ Supyandi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: “Apabila terdapat pejabat yang dinilai tidak mampu menjalankan tugas dan tanggung jawabnya secara optimal berdasarkan hasil evaluasi dan temuan pengawasan, DPRD dapat memberikan rekomendasi kepada pihak yang berwenang untuk melakukan evaluasi lebih lanjut, termasuk rekomendasi pergantian atau pemberhentian pejabat terkait.”

⁴⁴ Supyandi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: “Pelaksanaan tindak lanjut tetap menjadi kewenangan pemerintah daerah. DPRD dapat mendorong dan mengingatkan, tetapi tidak dapat mengambil alih kewenangan eksekutif.”

⁴⁵ Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 70 of 2019 concerning the Regional Government Information System; Presidential Regulation Number 16 of 2018 concerning Government Procurement of Goods/Services, as amended by Presidential Regulation Number 12 of 2021; Presidential Regulation Number 95 of 2018 concerning the Electronic-Based Government System.

⁴⁶ Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 14 of 2008 concerning Public Information Disclosure, art. 9.

“Sometimes the DPRD has told the community that an activity is already in the budget, but during the process there are administrative obstacles. For example, there was an error in data input. The budget was available, but the name or data in the proposal differed from the system used by the government. An activity intended for Mekar Mukti Village was recorded in the system as Mekarsari Village. Because the data did not match, disbursement was obstructed.”⁴⁷

This example is more than an administrative glitch. A mismatch between the proposal approved in budget deliberations and the record in the executive’s system means that the legislature cannot verify, from its own documents, where funds are allocated. The same opacity that delays a legitimate programme can conceal a diverted one. The duplicated road-construction entries described earlier are of the same nature: they were detected manually, by chance, during deliberation. In a digitalised budget cycle, oversight that relies on printed summaries and members’ memory is structurally disadvantaged against an executive that controls the underlying data. The literature on e-government confirms that technology reduces corruption only when it increases the visibility of transactions to external actors; digitalisation that remains internal to the executive may simply relocate discretion.⁴⁸

Comparative experience suggests what is at stake. In their comparison of Indonesia with South Korea and Finland, Candra and Tjenreng find that effective local financial oversight rests on integrated digital systems, independent oversight bodies, and a culture of integrity, whereas Indonesian e-budgeting and e-procurement remain fragmented.⁴⁹ Fragmentation has a specific consequence for regional legislatures. The DPRD approves the budget as a regional regulation, but the line items that are actually executed are entered, revised, and disbursed in the executive’s systems. Unless the DPRD can compare what it approved with what is recorded and paid, its budget function and its oversight function are disconnected, and the moment of greatest KKN risk—the translation of approved allocations into contracts and payments—escapes legislative view.

Data-driven oversight requires a legal basis and safeguards. Structured, read-only access for DPRD commissions to planning, budgeting, and procurement data can be grounded in the DPRD’s oversight function under Article 153, the right to request information inherent in its working meetings, and the disclosure duty under Law Number 14 of 2008. Such access should be implemented through dashboards that show the trajectory of each budget line from proposal to disbursement, automatic flags for duplicated or inconsistent entries, and audit trails of changes. Where datasets contain personal data—for example, lists of social assistance recipients—access must comply with the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation under the Personal Data Protection Law.⁵⁰ Aggregated or pseudonymised data would normally suffice for oversight. As automated systems increasingly shape administrative decisions, oversight bodies must also be able to scrutinise how those systems process data and

⁴⁷ Hilmi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: “Contohnya terjadi kesalahan dalam proses input data. Anggaran sebenarnya sudah tersedia, tetapi terdapat perbedaan nama atau data antara usulan dengan sistem yang digunakan pemerintah. Misalnya suatu kegiatan seharusnya diperuntukkan bagi Desa Mekar Mukti, tetapi dalam sistem tercatat sebagai Desa Mekarsari.”

⁴⁸ Andersen, “E-Government as an Anti-Corruption Strategy,” 201–10; Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes, “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of Transparency,” 264–71.

⁴⁹ Candra and Tjenreng, “Decentralization and Corruption,” 17–34.

⁵⁰ Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 27 of 2022 concerning Personal Data Protection.

generate outputs.⁵¹ This does not expand the DPRD's legal powers; it gives practical effect to transparency that the law already demands.

Factors Influencing Effectiveness and Conformity with Law Number 23 of 2014

Soekanto argues that the effectiveness of law depends on the law itself, the implementing actors, supporting facilities, the community, and legal culture.⁵² Table 2 applies this framework, distinguishing findings drawn from interview data from the authors' inferences from secondary data.

Table 2: Factors shaping the effectiveness of DPRD oversight in West Bandung Regency

Factor	Supporting conditions	Inhibiting conditions
Legal (norms)	Clear mandate in Arts. 149, 153, and 159 of Law No. 23/2014 (I, L)	No response deadline or reporting duty for DPRD recommendations, unlike BPK recommendations (I, L)
Implementing actors	Commission-based division of tasks; members understand role limits; conflict-of-interest rule (I)	Analytical capacity in budgeting and procurement depends on individual members (I)
Facilities and data	Working meetings, field visits, BPK reports as inputs (I)	Incomplete agency data; inconsistent records in electronic planning system (I)
Community	DPRD as channel for public aspirations (I)	No published follow-up status or structured complaint channel identified (A)
Legal culture	Constructive, prevention-oriented attitude in the DPRD (I)	Record of two convicted regents and SPI score of 69.85 (S)

Source: Analysed from interview data (I), legal materials (L), secondary data (S), and authors' inference (A).

The legal factor is a strength in scope and a weakness in consequence. As the Chair of Commission I put it, "the oversight function of the DPRD has a clear legal basis."⁵³ Yet the Law says almost nothing about what must happen after a recommendation is issued. In the language of effectiveness theory, the norm grants authority but is not designed to secure its own implementation. With respect to implementing actors, the commission system allows members to understand their partner agencies, but oversight of digitalised finance and procurement demands technical literacy that cannot be assumed, which confirms the capacity findings of Ratnasari and colleagues.⁵⁴ Bagir Manan's observation that every authority must be matched by the institutional ability to exercise it applies directly.⁵⁵

Capacity is not only an individual matter. The DPRD secretariat is formally an administrative support unit, but effective oversight of digitalised finance requires analytical support: staff who can extract data, compare budget versions, read audit reports, and prepare briefing notes before working meetings. Where such support is absent, members depend on

⁵¹ Firdaus Arifin, Harri Tri Ramdhan, and Mohammad Alvi Pratama, "Algorithmic Accountability and Administrative Decision-Making: Legal Implications of Automated Governance Systems," *Subsidiarity: Journal of Law and Technology Policy* 1, no. 1 (2026): 32–48, <https://e-journal.anharhariz.org/index.php/subsidiarity/article/view/183>.

⁵² Soekanto, *Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Penegakan Hukum*, 8.

⁵³ Supyandi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: "Fungsi pengawasan DPRD memiliki dasar hukum yang jelas."

⁵⁴ Ratnasari, Risnain, and Fallahiyan, "Implementasi Peran Fungsi Pengawasan DPRD NTB," 105–12.

⁵⁵ Bagir Manan, *Menyongsong Fajar Otonomi Daerah* (Yogyakarta: Pusat Studi Hukum Fakultas Hukum UII, 2001), 34.

summaries prepared by the agencies they oversee, which reverses the information asymmetry that oversight is meant to correct. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst's finding that the availability of oversight tools does not by itself guarantee effective oversight is pertinent: tools must be accompanied by the resources and incentives to use them.⁵⁶

The facilities factor has become a data factor, as discussed above. The community and legal-culture factors are less directly evidenced by the interviews; they are inferred from the absence of a published follow-up mechanism and from the regency's KKN record. The DPRD describes its stance as constructive—"not only looking for the government's mistakes, but making sure that programmes comply with the rules and benefit the community"—but legal culture is two-sided, and where the executive treats oversight findings as optional, even well-founded recommendations lose their effect.⁵⁷ Asshiddiqie's point that checks and balances function only when both institutions perform their roles applies here.⁵⁸

Measured against Article 153, the practice of the West Bandung DPRD largely conforms to the Law: it oversees regional regulations and executive policy, monitors the APBD, and follows up BPK findings, while respecting the boundary that it does not execute policy. The gap is therefore one of *effectiveness*, not of compliance. This qualifies the argument of Suripatty and colleagues that oversight should become more technical: in West Bandung the more pressing weakness is not the depth of inspection but the absence of a binding follow-up cycle.⁵⁹ It also adds a digital dimension to the West Java finding of a gap between regulation and implementation.⁶⁰

A Data-Driven Follow-Up Accountability Model

One response to the recommendatory ceiling would be to grant the DPRD executory powers. This article argues against that route: it would blur the division of functions under Article 57 and risk turning oversight into a bargaining tool, itself a source of collusion. The preferable reform keeps the DPRD within its constitutional role but ensures that its findings are answered, tracked, and made public. The model operates as a cycle (Figure 1) along three dimensions (Table 3).


⁵⁶ Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, *Tools for Legislative Oversight*.

⁵⁷ Supyandi, interview. Translated by the authors. Original: "DPRD tidak hanya mencari kesalahan pemerintah daerah, tetapi lebih kepada memastikan agar program yang dijalankan sesuai aturan dan memberikan manfaat bagi masyarakat."

⁵⁸ Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia* (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2010), 57.

⁵⁹ Suripatty, Salmon, and Mustamu, "Pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah," 181–205.

⁶⁰ Rizaldi et al., "The Role of the West Java Province DPRD in Supervision."

Figure 1: The data-driven follow-up accountability cycle

Source: Developed by the authors from the research findings. The 60-day response period is proposed by the authors by analogy with Article 20 of Law No. 15 of 2004; it is not a norm currently in force.

Table 3: Dimensions of the data-driven follow-up accountability model

Dimension	Main instruments	Expected effect on KKN prevention
Legal	Written executive response to each recommendation within 60 days; periodic follow-up reports to the commission; escalation to interpellation or inquiry when responses are absent	Recommendations become traceable obligations rather than advisory notes
Data and institutional	Read-only commission access to planning, budgeting, and procurement data; anomaly flags; analytical unit in the DPRD secretariat; annual risk-based oversight agenda	Oversight becomes evidence-based and focused on high-risk sectors
Governance	Publication of recommendations and follow-up status; structured complaint channel; coordination with APIP, BPK, and law enforcement	Wider transparency narrows the space for collusion

Source: Developed by the authors from the research findings.

The **legal dimension** introduces follow-up accountability. Its legal feasibility depends on the instrument chosen. The DPRD's rules of procedure bind only the DPRD and therefore can regulate how commissions record and monitor recommendations, but they cannot impose duties on the regent. Reforming them is nonetheless substantive: a review of provincial DPRD rules of procedure shows that they often leave deliberation largely ceremonial.⁶¹ A duty on the

⁶¹ Fauzi Syam et al., "From Ceremony to Substance: Reforming Problem Inventory List-Based Local Regulation Discussion in Indonesia," *Jambe Law Journal* 8, no. 1 (2025): 129–63, <https://doi.org/10.22437/home.v8i1.505>.

executive requires either a regional regulation, which is adopted jointly by the DPRD and the regent, or a regent regulation as an interim measure. A regional regulation may contain material for the administration of regional autonomy and may elaborate higher legislation, which provides room for procedures on responding to DPRD oversight.⁶² A durable solution lies in amending Government Regulation Number 12 of 2018 or Government Regulation Number 13 of 2019 to require a written response to DPRD recommendations within a fixed period. Existing statutes provide workable models: officials must respond to BPK recommendations within sixty days, and the reported party and its superior must implement Ombudsman recommendations and report on their implementation.⁶³ Persistent non-response would provide a documented basis for interpellation or inquiry. The design adds no new sanctions; it makes existing powers predictable and evidence-based, consistent with Soekanto's argument that a norm is effective when the rule, the implementing institution, and the consequences of compliance are clearly linked.⁶⁴

The **data and institutional dimension** operationalises the data-driven oversight described above. Commissions should adopt annual oversight agendas that prioritise sectors with the highest KKN risk—infrastructure, procurement, social assistance, and grants—which is where the case regency's past convictions arose. The DPRD secretariat should develop an analytical unit capable of reading financial statements, audit reports, and system data and of investigating anomalies such as duplicated or mismatched entries.

The **governance dimension** links oversight to transparency and participation. Publishing recommendations and their follow-up status lets citizens, the media, and civil society see whether problems are resolved; a structured complaint channel turns representation into early warning; and coordination with APIP, the BPK, and law enforcement prevents overlap while ensuring that serious indications of corruption are referred. Mardiasmo's account of good governance as transparent, accountable, and participatory management of public resources anchors this dimension.⁶⁵

Public participation can build on existing national infrastructure rather than new institutions. The national public service complaint system, SP4N-LAPOR!, already receives citizen complaints about public services; linking complaints concerning regional programmes to the relevant DPRD commission would give legislators early warning of irregularities in the field.⁶⁶ Combined with the publication of follow-up status, this would allow citizens to see whether complaints that reached the DPRD resulted in recommendations and whether those recommendations were acted upon.

Implementation can proceed in stages, and the same sequence applies to any regency or city DPRD. In the short term, a DPRD can amend its rules of procedure to require commissions to register every recommendation, set a target date for follow-up, and report follow-up status

⁶² Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Laws and Regulations, art. 14; Law Number 23 of 2014, art. 236.

⁶³ Law Number 15 of 2004, art. 20; Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 37 of 2008 concerning the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, art. 38.

⁶⁴ Soerjono Soekanto, *Efektivitas Hukum dan Peranan Sanksi* (Bandung: Remadja Karya, 1985), 12.

⁶⁵ Mardiasmo, *Otonomi dan Manajemen Keuangan Daerah* (Yogyakarta: Andi, 2009), 17–18.

⁶⁶ Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 76 of 2013 concerning the Management of Public Service Complaints.

in plenary sessions, and it can establish an analytical unit within the secretariat. In the medium term, a regent regulation or a regional regulation on transparency of regional government can impose the duty to respond and grant commissions read-only access to planning, budgeting, and procurement data. In the long term, the duty to respond to DPRD recommendations should be codified nationally, so that its effectiveness does not depend on the political will of a particular regional head anywhere in Indonesia.

The model is not free of risk. Published recommendations could be used for political positioning, and a duty to respond could be met with perfunctory replies. These risks are mitigated by tying recommendations to documented data, by involving APIP and the BPK, and by public scrutiny of the responses themselves, which makes evasive answers politically costly. The model also refines the literature: technical oversight and capacity, emphasised by earlier studies, are insufficient without a procedure that obliges the executive to answer, while a follow-up procedure without data and capacity would only generate formal replies to weak recommendations. In this sense, the model is consistent with Huda's view that the DPRD and the regional head should control each other while respecting each other's authority.⁶⁷

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that regional legislative oversight in Indonesia loses its preventive force not for lack of legal authority but at the post-recommendation stage. Law Number 23 of 2014 gives the DPRD a clear oversight mandate, and the case of West Bandung Regency shows that a DPRD can exercise it preventively through budget scrutiny, field verification, monitoring of Audit Board follow-up, and conflict-of-interest safeguards, in general conformity with the Law. Its effect on corruption, collusion, and nepotism is nevertheless limited because DPRD recommendations carry no response duty, analytical capacity is uneven, and inconsistent records in electronic planning systems prevent legislators from verifying where funds go. The article's contribution is a data-driven follow-up accountability model that combines a time-bound executive response to DPRD recommendations, modelled on existing follow-up duties for Audit Board and Ombudsman recommendations, with structured legislative access to government data and public disclosure of follow-up status. Because it rests on national legal provisions and national digital systems, the model is relevant to the design of regional legislative oversight throughout Indonesia. Future research should test it using executive and civil-society perspectives, DPRD records on recommendations and follow-up rates, and comparisons among regions with different integrity scores.

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⁶⁷ Huda, *Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia*, 245.

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